Voter Turnout and Political Repression in Authoritarian Governments

Start Date

August 2024

End Date

August 2024

Location

ALT 205

Abstract

Studies of elections and political repression have focused on different aspects of elections as determinants of political repression under authoritarian rule. The relationship between voter turnouts and political repression, however, is yet to be studied. Given the importance of voter turnouts for authoritarian rulers’ claims to legitimacy and popular support, we hypothesize that following elections with lower voter turnouts, authoritarian rulers are less likely to use political repression. We view this as resulting from authoritarian regimes’ inclination to convince a larger proportion of citizens to vote in the subsequent elections. To test this hypothesis, we use data from GDELT covering the years 1979 to 2024. Different levels of analysis (daily, weekly, and yearly) provide support for the hypothesis. This is after taking into account various factors that could potentially affect repressive behavior such as population, economics, and the presence of anti-government protests. This suggests that boycotting elections could be considered as a strategy to soften government repression under dictatorship.

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Voter Turnout and Political Repression in Authoritarian Governments

ALT 205

Studies of elections and political repression have focused on different aspects of elections as determinants of political repression under authoritarian rule. The relationship between voter turnouts and political repression, however, is yet to be studied. Given the importance of voter turnouts for authoritarian rulers’ claims to legitimacy and popular support, we hypothesize that following elections with lower voter turnouts, authoritarian rulers are less likely to use political repression. We view this as resulting from authoritarian regimes’ inclination to convince a larger proportion of citizens to vote in the subsequent elections. To test this hypothesis, we use data from GDELT covering the years 1979 to 2024. Different levels of analysis (daily, weekly, and yearly) provide support for the hypothesis. This is after taking into account various factors that could potentially affect repressive behavior such as population, economics, and the presence of anti-government protests. This suggests that boycotting elections could be considered as a strategy to soften government repression under dictatorship.