Rights and Rationality: Legal Personhood in the Digital Age
Start Date
April 2024
Location
CLC 207
Abstract
As artificial intelligence (AI) systems grow in both sophistication and in the extent to which they become integrated into our society, the problem of their legal status and rights becomes ever-more pressing. Determining the conditions of standing—a legal person or entity being recognized as having rights—will be the key addressing the ethical concerns surrounding the treatment of AI. When discussing rights, we often lean on the liberal tradition or our modern understanding of rights. This model is based on the notion that, by virtue of possessing a certain property, humans have natural rights that they cannot be denied. Johann Fichte's (1762-1814) model of rights, however, differs from the liberal tradition as it is anchored in mutual acknowledgment. According to his framework outlined in The Foundations of Natural Right, rational beings, through engagements with other rational beings, learn to voluntarily limit their freedom for the sake of others’ freedom. Drawing on Fichte’s model, we can conclude that if one is a rational being, then they have rights. Further, if you are rational, then you are embodied as you must have the means to carry out your will. AI is not embodied and this absence of embodiment prevents AI from fully engaging in the reciprocal recognition central to Fichte's model. Therefore it follows that AI is not rational and does not have rights. Through insights from Johnathan Bennett, one is able to distinguish genuine rationality from behavior that merely mimics rationality. While numerous objections could be raised, this presentation will focus on the necessity of embodiment for rationality. By exploring this aspect, we can gain a deeper understanding of the fundamental differences between the complex decision making processes that AI possesses and true rationality.
Rights and Rationality: Legal Personhood in the Digital Age
CLC 207
As artificial intelligence (AI) systems grow in both sophistication and in the extent to which they become integrated into our society, the problem of their legal status and rights becomes ever-more pressing. Determining the conditions of standing—a legal person or entity being recognized as having rights—will be the key addressing the ethical concerns surrounding the treatment of AI. When discussing rights, we often lean on the liberal tradition or our modern understanding of rights. This model is based on the notion that, by virtue of possessing a certain property, humans have natural rights that they cannot be denied. Johann Fichte's (1762-1814) model of rights, however, differs from the liberal tradition as it is anchored in mutual acknowledgment. According to his framework outlined in The Foundations of Natural Right, rational beings, through engagements with other rational beings, learn to voluntarily limit their freedom for the sake of others’ freedom. Drawing on Fichte’s model, we can conclude that if one is a rational being, then they have rights. Further, if you are rational, then you are embodied as you must have the means to carry out your will. AI is not embodied and this absence of embodiment prevents AI from fully engaging in the reciprocal recognition central to Fichte's model. Therefore it follows that AI is not rational and does not have rights. Through insights from Johnathan Bennett, one is able to distinguish genuine rationality from behavior that merely mimics rationality. While numerous objections could be raised, this presentation will focus on the necessity of embodiment for rationality. By exploring this aspect, we can gain a deeper understanding of the fundamental differences between the complex decision making processes that AI possesses and true rationality.
